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Several attacks have been proposed on quantum key distribution systems with gated single-photon
detectors. The attacks involve triggering the detectors outside the center of the detector gate,
and/or using bright illumination to exploit classical photodiode mode of the detectors. Hence a
secure detection scheme requires two features: The detection events must take place in the middle
of the gate, and the detector must be single-photon sensitive. Here we present a technique called bit-
mapped gating, which is an elegant way to force the detections in the middle of the detector gate by
coupling detection time and quantum bit error rate. We also discuss how to guarantee single-photon
sensitivity by directly measuring detector parameters. Bit-mapped gating also provides a simple way
to measure the detector blinding parameter in security proofs for quantum key distribution systems
with detector efficiency mismatch, which up until now has remained a theoretical, unmeasurable
quantity. Thus if single-photon sensitivity can be guaranteed within the gates, a detection scheme
with bit-mapped gating satisfies the assumptions of the current security proofs.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum mechanics allows two parties, Alice and Bob,
to grow a random, secret bit string at a distance [1–4].
In theory, the quantum key distribution (QKD) is secure,
even if an eavesdropper Eve can do anything allowed by
the currently known laws of nature [5–9].
In practical QKD systems there will always be imper-
fections. The security of QKD systems with a large vari-
ety of imperfections has been proved [5, 10–15]. Device-
independent QKD tries to minimize the number of as-
sumptions on the system, but unfortunately the few as-
sumptions [2, 16, 17] in the security proofs seem to be too
strict to allow useful implementations [18] with current
technology [19].
Several security loopholes caused by imperfections
have been identified, and attacks have been proposed and
in some cases implemented [13, 20–32]. With notable ex-
ceptions [20, 21, 25, 28, 31], most of the loopholes are
caused by an insufficient model of the detectors.
While several detection schemes exist, most implemen-
tations use avalanche photodiodes (APDs) gated in the
time-domain to avoid high rate of dark counts. Gated
means that the APD is single-photon sensitive only when
a photon is expected to arrive, in a time window called
the detector gate. Attacks on these detection schemes are
based on exploiting the classical photodiode mode of the
APD, or the detector response at the beginning/end of
the detector gate.
In the attacks based on the classical photodiode mode
of the APD, the detectors are triggered by bright pulses
[26, 29]. If necessary, the APDs can be kept in the clas-
sical photodiode mode, in a so-called blind state, using
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additional bright background illumination [26, 27, 29, 32,
33]. When the detectors are blind, they are not single-
photon sensitive any more, but only respond to bright
optical trigger pulses. In most gated systems, blinding is
not necessary because the APDs are in the classical pho-
todiode mode outside the gates. Therefore, in the after-
gate attack [34], the trigger pulses are simply placed after
the gate.
Several attacks are based on detector efficiency mis-
match (DEM) [22]. If Bob’s apparatus has DEM, Eve
can control the efficiencies of Bob’s detectors individu-
ally, by choosing a parameter t in some external domain.
Examples of such domains can be the timing, polariza-
tion, or frequency of the photons [12, 22]. As an example,
consider DEM in the time-domain. Usually Bob’s appa-
ratus contains two single-photon detectors to detect the
incoming photons, one for each bit value. Due to differ-
ent optical path lengths, inaccuracies in the electronics,
and finite precision in detector manufacturing, the detec-
tion windows and hence the efficiency curves of the two
detectors a and b are slightly shifted, as seen in Fig. 1(a).
Several attacks exploit DEM [13, 22, 23] in various proto-
cols [35], some of which are implementable with current
technology. The time-shift attack [23] has been used to
gain an information-theoretical advantage for Eve when
applied to a commercially available QKD system [30]. In
the experiment, Eve captured partial information about
the key in 4% of her attempts, such that she could im-
prove her search over possible keys.
After each loophole has been identified, effort has been
made to restore security of the detection schemes. DEM
is now included in the receiver model of several security
proofs [12, 13, 15] as an efficiency mismatch or blinding
parameter η, defined differently according to the gener-
ality of the proof. For arbitrary systems that can be
2described with linear optics [13],
η =
mint {ηa(t), ηb(t)}
maxt {ηa(t), ηb(t)}
, (1)
where ηa(t) and ηb(t) are the detection efficiencies of the
two detectors. Here t labels the different optical modes;
in the special case without mode coupling it labels the dif-
ferent temporal modes. An example is given in Fig. 1(a).
In the most general case η is given by the lowest prob-
ability that a non-vacuum state incident to Bob is de-
tected [15]. For either definition of η, there is an infinite
number of modes involved (all superpositions of temporal
modes [13]) which makes the blinding parameter difficult
to measure or bound in practice. For a given value of η,
the secret key rate is given by [15]
R ≥ −h(E) + η(1− h(E)), (2)
where E is the quantum bit error rate (QBER) measured
by Alice and Bob, and h(·) is the binary Shannon entropy
function. Here we have assumed symmetry between the
bases in the protocol; in addition, we have ignored any
basis leakage from Alice and back-reflection from Bob
(the most general expression is given in the original ref-
erence [15]). Unfortunately, in practical systems the rate
(2) will usually be zero, since η → 0 due to the edges
of the detector gates. For the commercial QKD system
subject to the time-shift attack, η < 0.01 (estimated from
the curves in [30, Fig. 3] using Eq. (1)).
As noted in [13], one way of obtaining a better η would
be to discard pulses near the edge of the detector gate.
Then η could be calculated from (1) including only the
modes t which are accepted as valid detections. How-
ever, this is highly non-trivial. The avalanche in an APD
is a random process, and the jitter in the photon-timing
resolution is of the same order of magnitude as the du-
ration of the detector gate. A good photon-timing re-
solving detector still has 27 ps jitter [36]. Furthermore,
the unavoidable difference in the acceptance windows for
the different detectors will also contribute to DEM (one
detector accepts clicks while the other discards them).
A frequently mentioned countermeasure for systems
with DEM is called four-state Bob [22, 23, 37, 38]. Then
Bob uses a random detector–bit mapping, randomly as-
signing the bit values 0 and 1 to the detectors a, b
for each gate. In a phase-encoded QKD system, this
can be implemented by Bob choosing from four differ-
ent phase settings {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} instead of only two
{0, pi/2}. Then Eve does not know which detector char-
acteristics correspond to which bit value. However, as
mentioned previously [13, 22, 23] this patch opens a dif-
ferent security loophole. Eve may use a Trojan-horse
attack [20, 21, 39, 40] to read Bob’s phase modulator
settings, thus additional hardware modifications are re-
quired. Note also that the four-state Bob patch does not
secure against the after-gate attack [34] nor any of the
detector control attacks [29, 33].
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Bit-mapped gating. (a) Detector gates
with DEM. ηa(t) (blue, dashed) and ηb(t) (red, solid) are the
efficiencies of the two detectors a and b. (b),(c) Possible op-
tical bit-mapping (purple) when the software bit-mapping is
set to a → 0, b → 1 (Fig. (b)) and a → 1, b → 0 (Fig. (c)). In
a phase-encoded system the two levels would correspond to 0
and pi phase shift in one basis, and pi/2 and 3pi/2 phase shift
in the opposite basis. Note that the software bit-mapping
and the optical bit-mapping coincide in the bit-mapped gate,
which is well within the detector gates. (d) QBER
min
(t)
(green) as obtained from (8) with the bit-mapped gate shown
in (b) and (c).
Here we present a novel way of securing Bob’s re-
ceiver called bit-mapped gating (Section II). It secures
the system against all kinds of pulses outside the central
part of the detector gate in the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) and related protocols [1, 41–43]. The technique
is compatible with the existing security proofs [12, 13, 15]
and makes it simple to find η. In general it represents
a useful concept, where parameters from characteristics
of the QKD system are coupled to the parameters esti-
mated by the protocol. In this case η becomes coupled
to the QBER. Subsequently we analyze the security of
bit-mapped gating (Section III), discuss how to charac-
terize detectors, and how to implement a guarantee of
single-photon sensitivity (Section IV). Finally we con-
clude (Section V).
3II. BIT-MAPPED GATING
Let us start with two definitions. The software bit-
mapping determines how the signals from detectors a
and b are mapped into the logical bits 0, 1. Similarly the
optical bit-mapping which can be implemented by gener-
alizing the basis selector, maps quantum states with bit
values 0, 1 (for instance |0〉, |1〉 in the Z-basis) to the
detectors a, b. Note that if the software bit-mapping and
the optical bit-mapping do not coincide, a bit value 0
sent by Alice will be detected as bit value 1 by Bob.
Bit-mapped gating works as follows:
• Somewhere in between the detector gates, Bob ran-
domly selects the software bit-mapping, assigning
detectors a, b to bit values 0, 1.
• Likewise, the basis is selected randomly between
theX and Z basis, along with a random optical bit-
mapping. Since this happens between the detector
gates, jitter is not critical.
• Inside the detector gate, the optical bit-mapping is
matched to the software bit-mapping. The period
with matching optical and software bit-mapping is
the bit-mapped gate.
Note that the optical bit-mapping can be equal on both
sides of the bit-mapped gate to minimize the need for
random numbers. Fig. 1 shows a typical time diagram.
As an example, consider a phase-encoded implementa-
tion of the BB84 protocol, where the basis selector at Bob
is usually a phase modulator. 0 phase shift corresponds
to Z basis and pi/2 phase shift corresponds to theX basis.
The optical bit-mapping can be selected by adding either
0 or pi to the phase shift. Hence in this implementation
the bit-mapped gating patch could be implemented as
follows: Bob randomly selects the software bit-mapping
somewhere between the gates. Furthermore, Bob selects
a random basis, i.e. 0 or pi/2 phase shift between the
gates, and adds either 0 or pi to the phase shift to apply
the random optical bit-mapping. During the gate, the
software and the optical bit-mapping coincide.
All states received and detected outside the bit-
mapping gate cause random detection results (due to the
random optical and software bit-mapping), and thus in-
troduce a QBER of 50%. The measured QBER could be
used to estimate the fraction of detections which must
have happened in the center of the gate (in Fig. 1: close
to zero QBER would mean that most detection events
must have passed the basis selector, and thus hit the
detector, in the middle of the gate). This can be used
to limit the DEM, because considering only the modes
in the center of the detector gate gives less DEM than
considering all modes.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The goal of this section is to derive an expression for
the minimum QBER introduced by any state received by
Bob, during the transition to and from the bit-mapped
gate. Ideally, the minimum QBER is 0 inside the bit-
mapped gate, and 1/2 outside the bit-mapped gate.
The input of Bob’s detection system consists of many
optical modes t, for instance corresponding to different
arrival times at Bob’s system. Each mode t may con-
tain a mixture of different number states. Note that Bob
could have measured the photon number in each mode
without disturbing the later measurement; thus it suf-
fices to address specific number states. We use the usual
assumption that each photon in a n-photon state is de-
tected individually. Under these assumptions, we first
calculate the minimum QBER caused by a single photon
arriving in a single mode at Bob. Then, in appendix A
we show that multiple photons in this mode, or photons
in other modes can only increase the minimum QBER.
Consider a single photon arriving at Bob in a given
mode t. Since the BB84 protocol is symmetric with re-
spect to the bit values and the bases, we may assume
without loss of generality that Alice sent Z0 and that
Bob measures in the Z basis. Outside the bit-mapped
gate, Bob performs four different measurements depend-
ing on the software and optical bit-mapping. For each
measurement, Bob will obtain one out of three measure-
ment outcomes, bit 0, bit 1 or vacuum denoted by sub-
script v.
Let ηa, ηb be the efficiencies of the two detectors, |θ〉 =
cos θ|0〉+sin θ|1〉 and |θ⊥〉 = sin θ|0〉− cos θ|1〉. During a
bit-mapped gate, θ is varied from 0 to pi/2. For each value
of θ, Bob performs one out of the four measurements
M0 = ηa|0〉〈0|,M1 = ηb|1〉〈1|,
Mv = I −M0 −M1,
(3a)
M ′0 = ηb|0〉〈0|,M
′
1 = ηa|1〉〈1|,
M ′v = I −M
′
0 −M
′
1,
(3b)
M ′′0 = ηa|θ〉〈θ|,M
′′
1 = ηb|θ
⊥〉〈θ⊥|,
M ′′v = I −M
′′
0 −M
′′
1 ,
(3c)
M ′′′0 = ηb|θ〉〈θ|,M
′′′
1 = ηa|θ
⊥〉〈θ⊥|,
M ′′′v = I −M
′′′
0 −M
′′′
1 .
(3d)
If Bob uses the four measurements with equal proba-
bilities, the statistics will be given by using the measure-
ment operators
E0 =
1
4
(M0 +M
′
0 +M
′′
0 +M
′′′
0 )
=
1
4
(ηa + ηb)((1 + cos
2 θ)|0〉〈0|+ sin2 θ|1〉〈1|
+ sin θ cos θ(|0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|)),
(4a)
4E1 =
1
4
(M1 +M
′
1 +M
′′
1 +M
′′′
1 )
=
1
4
(ηa + ηb)(sin
2 θ|0〉〈0|+ (1 + cos2 θ)|1〉〈1|
− sin θ cos θ(|0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|)),
(4b)
Ev =
1
4
(Mv +M
′
v +M
′′
v +M
′′′
v )
=
(
1−
ηa + ηb
2
)
I.
(4c)
Note that Ev ∝ I, so the detection probability is inde-
pendent of the photon-state ρ:
pdet = 1− Tr[ρEv] =
ηa + ηb
2
. (5)
The eigenvalues of operators E0 and E1 are given by
pdet(1±cos θ)/2. Thus the minimum and maximum prob-
ability of detecting bit values 0 and 1 for any single pho-
ton sent by Eve is given by
p0,min = p1,min =
pdet
2
(1− cos θ), (6)
p0,max = p1,max =
pdet
2
(1 + cos θ). (7)
Since Alice sent Z0, the minimum QBER introduced by
a single photon is given by
QBERmin =
p1,min
pdet
=
1
2
(1− cos θ) (8)
As expected, for θ = pi/2 QBERmin = 1/2. For multi-
photons, a random bit value is assigned to double clicks
[10, 14]. Appendix A shows that sending multiple pho-
tons can only increase the QBER caused by detection
events. Hence Eq. (8) gives the minimum QBER for any
photonic state sent by Eve.
The security proofs in Refs. [12, 13, 15] involve Bob
predicting the results of Alice’s virtual X-basis measure-
ment. Since the prediction is not carried out in practice,
Bob can perform any operation permitted by quantum
mechanics. In the proofs Bob’s prediction consists of
a filter followed by an “X-basis” measurement. When
nothing is known about the distribution of the detec-
tion events within the gate, the worst case assumption is
that all the detection events occur with maximum DEM.
Therefore, the best filter we can construct can only guar-
antee that a fraction η of the inputs can successfully pass
the filter.
With our patch, we may use the QBER to determine
a lower bound for the number of detection events which
must have happened in the central part of the detector
gate. Assuming that t labels temporal modes, consider
the number of detection events which occurred in the
range where QBERmin < E
′ (see Fig. 2). Here, E′ is a
threshold selected by Bob. Let η′ be the blinding param-
eter for the modes for the range where QBERmin < E
′.
It can be calculated from Eq. (1), but where t only runs
Efficiency
ηa(t) ηb(t)
E′
0.5
0
0
QBER
min
(t)
t
t
FIG. 2. (Color online) Curves (a) and (d) from Fig. 1. The
dashed line shows how a threshold E′ can be used to limit the
range of modes t used to calculate or bound η′.
over this range. If the measured QBER is equal to E, a
fraction
f =
E′ − E
E′
, (9)
must have been detected in the modes where QBERmin <
E′. Note that increasing E′ increases f , and may de-
crease η′ (see Fig. 2). As will become apparent below, E′
should be selected to maximize fη′.
For decoy protocols [41–43], E should be replaced with
the QBER estimated for single-photon states. This im-
proves the estimate of the fraction f , especially for large
distances where the dark counts become a major part of
the total QBER.
In the worst case, a fraction f experienced a reduced
DEM η′. Therefore, the filters in the security proofs can
be replaced as follows: the new filter discards pulses in
the modes for which QBERmin > E
′. For the modes in-
side the bit-mapped gate, where QBERmin < E
′, the new
filter reverts the quantum operation from the receiver in
the opposite basis in the same way that the old filter re-
verted it for all modes, but now having success rate η′.
Since we can guarantee that a fraction f of the photons
are in the bit-mapped gate, at least η′f pulses will suc-
cessfully pass the new filter. Therefore the parameter η
in all the proofs [12, 13, 15] can be replaced with η′f ,
and the rate (2) becomes
R ≥ −h(E) + fη′[1− h(E)], (10)
when one assumes symmetry between the bases, and no
source errors. Without symmetry between the bases, all
parameters become basis-dependent, and the rate is the
sum of the rates in each basis.
Let us see how bit-mapped gating could improve the
secure key rate for the commercial QKD system in [30].
5For this system η < 0.01. In the same experiment, the
QBER is measured to be 5.68%. Assuming E′ = 0.45 and
η′ = 0.9, fη′ becomes 0.79; thus a substantial improve-
ment. In fact, the rate obtained from Eq. (2) without
the patch is 0, while the rate obtained from Eq. (10) is
0.227, so clearly the patch can be used to re-secure an
insecure implementation.
IV. DETECTOR DESIGN AND
CHARACTERIZATION
When designing Bob’s system, one should ensure that
the bit-mapped gate is well within the detector gate,
i.e. that the detector efficiencies are approximately equal
within the bit-mapped gate. Then, it should be possible
to measure or bound the detector efficiencies and the ba-
sis selector response θ(t) in the temporal domain. In a
phase-encoded system this would correspond to measur-
ing the detector efficiencies and the phase modulation as
a function of time [44], over the range of wavelengths and
polarizations accepted by Bob. With this data, the mini-
mum QBER as a function of time can be calculated from
(8), and a diagram similar to Fig. 2 can be obtained.
After selecting an appropriate limit E′, η′ can be calcu-
lated by (1) but where t runs only over the modes where
QBERmin < E
′, and not over all available modes.
In general there might be coupling between the differ-
ent temporal modes due to misalignments and multiple
reflections [12, 13]. The bit-mapped gate ensures that
the pulse passed the basis selector inside the temporal
detector gate, but does not guarantee the actual detec-
tion time. For example, a pulse could pass in the center
of the bit-mapped gate, but afterwards take a multiple
reflection path such that it hits the detector outside the
detector gate. This can be handled by characterizing the
worst case mode coupling as described previously [13].
Let δ be the worst case (power) coupling of modes inside
the bit-mapped gate to outside the gate. This will typi-
cally be the worst case multiple-reflection path after the
basis selector, and should be boundable from component
characteristics. Then, the parameter δ can be interpreted
as
δ =
#pulses that hits the detector outside the gate
#pulses sent into the gate
.
(11)
In the worst case, δ of the f detection events might have
happened outside the central part of the detector gate;
thus one must let f → f(1− δ).
Finally one must guarantee that the detectors are not
blind within the gate [29], and fulfill the assumptions
in Section III during the transition of the optical bit-
mapping. Note that the transition ends when there is no
longer any correlation between the software bit-mapping
and the optical bit-mapping. If a significant correlation
exists also after the detector gate, it could be exploited
in the after-gate attack [34].
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FIG. 3. (Color online) A calibrated light source inside Bob.
The figure shows the Bob module in a plug-and-play system
[4, 45–47] with two possible implementations of the calibrated
light source: either a separate attenuated laser diode (LD) at
a suitable place, or in the case of send-return systems where
Bob already contains a laser diode a weakly reflective element
(R) to reflect some light back into the APDs. A short delay
line (DL, delay > gate period/2) at Bob’s input guarantees
that Eve cannot interfere with the detector operation based on
whether the source is activated or not. PBS: polarizing beam
splitter; Att.: optical attenuator; PM: phase modulator; C:
50/50% fiber-optic coupler.
Although it is tempting to place an optical watchdog
detector at the entrance of Bob, the absence of bright il-
lumination does not necessarily mean that the detectors
are single-photon sensitive. For instance, due to the ther-
mal inertia of the APD, it can remain blind for a long
time after the bright illumination is turned off [33].
A cheap way to guarantee single-photon sensitivity is
to monitor all detector parameters [27], such as APD
bias voltage, current and temperature. It seems difficult
to monitor the temperature of the APD chip [33], but
monitoring the bias voltage and current should make it
possible to predict the heat generated by the APD, and
thus prevent thermal blinding [33].
The ultimate way of guaranteeing single-photon sen-
sitivity is to measure it directly. This can be done by
placing a calibrated light source inside Bob that emits
faint pulses at random times [32] (see Fig. 3). Then the
absence of detection events caused by this source would
indicate that the detector is blind. Further, a calibrated
light source inside Bob could be useful in more ways,
for instance to characterize and calibrate detector per-
formance in deployed systems.
The patch could cause a minor reduction in QKD
performance compared to running an (insecure) system
without the patch. In particular, the detector gates
might have to be longer to contain the basis-selector gate.
This would increase the dark count rate, and thus limit
the maximum transmission distance. A calibrated light
source inside Bob would also cause a minor reduction
in the performance since the gates used for testing the
detector sensitivity likely cannot be used to extract the
secret key. However, both these effects are minor, and
are easily justified by the restoration of security.
6V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a technique called “bit-
mapped gating” to secure gated single-photon detectors
in QKD systems. It is based on a general concept where
hardware imperfections are coupled to the parameters
estimated by the protocol. Bit-mapped gating causes all
detection events outside the central part of the detector
gate to cause high QBER.
Bit-mapped gating is compatible with the current secu-
rity proofs for QKD systems with detector efficiency mis-
match [12, 13, 15]. In particular it provides a simple way
of measuring the detector blinding parameter. A secure
gated detection scheme is obtained if bit-mapped gat-
ing is combined with detectors guaranteed to be single-
photon sensitive.
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Appendix A: Minimum QBER for multiphotons
Here we prove that the minimum QBER can only in-
crease when the number of photons sent to Bob is in-
creased. As noted previously we use the usual assump-
tion that each photon in a n-photon state is detected
individually. This means that each photon hits a sepa-
rate set of detectors, and then the detection results are
merged to give the detection results of threshold detec-
tors.
Let us first consider the case where Bob receives a large
number of two-photon states. Let the two photons within
the states be labeled 1 and 2. Individually, each of the
two photons would have caused the minimum QBER Q1
and Q2 (as found from Eq. (8)). Again we assume that
Alice sends the bit value 0, without loss of generality. For
two-photon states there will be three cases of detected
events: either only photon 1 is detected, only photon 2
is detected, or both photons are detected (in our model,
this latter possibility corresponds to the case where both
sets of detectors register a click). Let there be n1 events
where only photon 1 was detected, n2 events where only
photon 2 was detected, and c events where both photons
were detected. For photon i, out of the ni = ni,0 + ni,1
events, ni,0 and ni,1 were detected as the bit value 0 and
1, respectively. Likewise, out of the c = ci,0 + ci,1 events
where both photons are detected, ci,0 and ci,1 were de-
tected as the bit value 0 and 1 for photon i (remember
that in the model each photon hits a separate set of de-
tectors).
When only one of the photons is detected, the situa-
tion is identical to the single-photon case treated in Sec-
tion III. Hence states such that Qi = ni,1/ni give the
lowest possible QBER. For the events where both pho-
tons are detected, the detections can have any correla-
tion, but for each photon ci,1 ≥ cQi since Qi represents
the lowest fraction of the bit value 1 possible, regard-
less of the correlation with any other photon. The total
QBER Q can be found from merging the detections from
the two sets of detectors. Double clicks are assigned a
random bit value [10, 14], therefore half of the double
clicks get the bit value 1. This gives the total QBER
Q =
n1,1 + n2,1 +
1
2
(c1,1 + c2,1)
n1 + n2 + c
≥
Q1
(
n1 +
c
2
)
+Q2
(
n2 +
c
2
)
n1 + n2 + c
≥ min (Q1, Q2) .
(A1)
By repeating the argument above, but replacing the
detection of photon 1 with the detection of N photons,
it is easy to see that Q ≥ min (QN , QN+1). Hence by
induction, any detection event caused by more than one
photon can only cause a higher QBER than the single-
photon case.
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